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INTRODUCTION
The STS-76 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities
as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid
Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems
performance during the seventy-sixth flight of the Space Shuttle Program, the fifty-first
flight since the return-to-flight, and the sixteenth flight of the Orbiter Atlantis (OV-104).
In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated
ET-77; three SSMEs that were designated as serial numbers 2035, 2109, and 2019 in
positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBs that were designated BI-079. The
RSRMs, designated RSRM-46, were installed in each SRB and the individual RSRMs
were designated as 360T046A for the left SRB, and 360T046B for the right SRB.
The STS-76 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program
requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VII, Appendix E. The requirement
stated in that document is that each organizational element supporting the Program will
report the results of their hardware (and software) evaluation and mission performance
plus identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objectives of this flight were to rendezvous and dock with the Mir Space
Station and transfer one U. S. Astronaut to the Mir. A single Spacehab module carried
science equipment and hardware, Risk Mitigation Experiments (RMEs), and Russian
Logistics in support of the Phase 1 Program requirements. In addition, the European
Space Agency (ESA) Biorack operations were performed.
The STS-76 mission was planned as a 9-day flight plus 1 day for payload contingency
operations plus 2 contingency days that were available for weather avoidance or Orbiter
contingency operations. The sequence of events for the STS-76 mission is shown in
Table I, and the Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering In-Flight Anomaly (IFA) list is shown
in Table II. The Government Furnished Equipment/Flight Crew Equipment (GFE/FCE)
IFA list is shown in Table III. Appendix A lists the sources of data, both formal and
informal, that were used to prepare this report. Appendix B provides the definition of
acronyms and abbreviations used throughout the report. All times during the flight are
given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time (MET).
The six-person crew for STS-76 consisted of Kevin P. Chilton, Col., U. S. Air Force,
Commander; Richard A. Searfoss, It. Col., U. S. Air Force, Pilot; Ronald M. Sega,
Civilian, Ph. D., Mission Specialist 1; M. Richard Clifford, Civilian, Mission Specialist 2;
Linda M. Godwin, Civilian, Ph.D. Mission Specialist 3; and Shannon W. Lucid, Civilian
Ph.D., Mission Specialist 4. STS-76 was the third space flight for the Commander and
Mission Specialist 2 and Mission Specialist 3, the fifth space flight for the Mission
Specialist 4, and the second space flight for the Pilot and Mission Specialist 1. Five of
the six crewmembers are credited with 221 hours 15 minutes and 53 seconds of space
flight for this mission. The sixth crewmember, Mission Specialist 4, became a member
of the Mir-21 crew at 53 hours 17 minutes MET.
MISSION SUMMARY
After a flawless countdown, the STS-76 liftoff occurred at 082:08:13:03.999 G.m.t.
(March 22, 1996, at 2:13 a.m.c.s.t.), and the launch phase was completed
satisfactorily. The orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 2 dual-engine maneuver was
performed at 082:08:55:26.0 G.m.t. (00:00:42:22 MET) with a differential velocity (_V)
of 76.0 ft/sec. The planned orbit of 85 nmi. by 160 nmi. was achieved. The payload
bay door opening was completed at 082:09:48:09 G.m.t. (00:01:35:05 MET).
An evaluation of SSME and SRB propulsive performance using vehicle acceleration
and preflight propulsion prediction data showed an average flight-derived engine
specific impulse (Isp) of 452.54 seconds as compared with the predicted (tag) value of
452.87 seconds. The Ispwas calculated for the time period from SRB separation to the
start of 3g throttling.
One in-flight anomaly was identified in that the fuel prebumer chamber channel A
igniter failed to indicate on at engine start on SSME 2 (Flight Problem STS-76-E-1).
This is the first occurrence of an igniter failing to indicate on at engine start. The lack of
a spark indication may be real or may be a failure in the monitoring circuit.
Troubleshooting is continuing in an effort to isolate the cause of the anomaly. Checkout
tests have not duplicated the anomaly on channel A; however, the fuel prebumer
chamber channel B igniter has failed to spark during tests.
During the ascent phase, a hydraulic leak from system 3 was noted. Analysis of the
hydraulic system 3 leak data showed a significant decrease in the hydraulic system 3
reservoir quantity of approximately 1 percent/minute of run time. The quantity
decreased from 63 percent to 54 percent with a slight increase to 56 percent prior to
auxiliary power unit (APU) shutdown. The thrust vector control (TVC) isolation valve for
this system was closed in an attempt to halt the decrease; however, the reservoir
quantity continued to decrease. APU 3 was taken to the low-pressure mode shortly
after valve closure. APUs 1 and 2 were shut down while APU 3 was left running in the
low-pressure mode for an additional four minutes. No significant quantity decrease was
noted during low-pressure operation. The APU was shut down and the hydraulic
system was returned to the normal-pressure mode after shutdown. Approximately
48 hours later, the hydraulic system 3 reservoir quantity showed a slight decrease to
44.0 percent. A comparison of the rate plots of quantity versus temperature for each of
the hydraulic systems showed a similar quantity decrease rate on each system, which
indicated that system 3 was not leaking while shut down.
The hydraulic system data were presented to the Mission Management Team (MMT)
for a final determination of the manner in which the mission was to be completed. The
decision was made to continue the mission to the planned landing time on March 31,
1996, with some tightening of the landing constraints concerning crosswinds, cloud
coverage and landing-site selection.
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Analysis of data revealed two periods of under-cooling occurred on water spray boiler
(WSB) systems 1 and 3 (to 265 °F and 307 °F, respectively). System 2 experienced
one period of over-cooling to 195 °F. These conditions did not impact APU or hydraulic
system operations.
The crew observed gas bubbles in the water after galley activation. After performing
the galley-purge procedure, the crew reported an acceptable level of bubbles in the hot
water and no bubbles in the cold water.
Nominal deployment of the Ku-band antenna was performed at 082:12:30 G.m.t.
(00:02:17 MET). The port radiator was deployed to provide cooling and contribute to
conservation of water for transfer to the Russian Mir space station.
Extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) checkout began at approximately 083:05:13 G.m.t.
(00:21:00 MET). Both EMUs performed nominally during the checkout and were ready
to support the extravehicular activity (EVA) on flight day six.
At 082:11:55:29.8 G.m.t. (000:03:42:25.8 MET), the OMS was used to perform the NC1
(OMS-3) Mir-rendezvous maneuver. This was a 42.8-second dual-engine, straight-feed
firing. The _V was 69 ft/sec, and this placed the vehicle in a 159 by 123 nmi. orbit. The
NC2 (OMS-4) Mir-rendezvous maneuver occurred at 082:23:49:04.2 G.m.t.
(00:15:36:00.2 MET) using the right OMS engine configured for straight feed. The
maneuver was 9.8 seconds in duration with a resulting AV of approximately 8 ft/sec,
raising the orbit to 158.8 by 126.4 nmi. A 57.2-second dual-engine straight-feed NC3
(OMS-5) Mir-rendezvous maneuver occurred at 083:09:24:26.8 G.m.t.
(01:01:11:22.8 MET) with a AV of 93 ft/sec and a resulting orbit of 210 by 127 nmi.
OMS performance was nominal during all three of these maneuvers.
The docking system was initially powered up at 083:09:45 G.m.t. (01:01:32 MET). The
guide ring was extended to the ready-to-dock position in dual-motor time, after which
the system was powered off. The ball-screw position data were nominal and similar to
STS-74 data. The temperature of the docking system ranged from 51 to 65 o F, which
was well within limits.
The port radiator panels were stowed at 083:23:14:04 G.m.t. (01:15:01:00 MET). The
Russian Mission Control Center personnel requested that the aft compartment vent
doors be closed to preclude contamination by any free hydraulic fluid that might have
existed in that area. In response to this request, port vent doors 8 and 9 were closed at
084:00:25 G.m.t. (01:16:12 MET), and starboard vent doors 8 and 9 were closed three
minutes later.
Two additional OMS maneuvers were performed in support of the Mir rendezvous. The
dual-engine NC4 (OMS-6) firing was executed at 083:22:16:37.6 G.m.t.
(01:14:03:33.6 MET) and was 85.4 seconds in duration with a resultant AV of
141 ft/sec. The left orbital maneuvering engine (OME) was used for the terminal phase
initiation (TI) maneuver (OMS-7) at 083:23:51:38.2 G.m.t. (01:15:38:34.2 MET). The
firing duration was 11 seconds and the resulting _V was 9 ft/sec.
The Orbiter docking system (ODS) was powered on at 084:01:54 G.m.t.
(01:17:41 MET) in preparation for the docking. The ODS temperatures ranged from
60 °F to 78 °F, which was well within limits. The Ku-band radar acquired Mir at
083:23:09 G.m.t. (01:13:56 MET) at a range of 137,861 feet (approximately 23 nmi.).
Mir was tracked to a range of 330 feet at 084:01:50 G.m.t. (01:17:37 MET), at which
time the Ku-band was configured to the communications mode for downlink of docking
video. The trajectory control sensors (TCSs) 1 and 2 were activated at 083:23:58
G.m.t. (01:15:45 MET) and 084:01:22 G.m.t. (01:17:09 MET), respectively. Both units
tracked the target until after the Mir docking was completed. Docking was completed at
084:02:50:09.9 G.m.t. (01:18:37:05.9 MET) and vestibule pressurization followed. After
hatch opening at 083:28:31 G.m.t. (01:20:18 MET) and pressure equalization with Mir,
the Orbiter cabin pressure was 14.23 psia.
The crew could not locate a camera bayonet bracket that was to be used during EVA.
It was determined that this hardware had been inadvertently omitted from the hardware
shipment to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for stowage in the Spacehab module. A
workaround was developed that enabled the camera to be used for the EVA operations.
Revised limits for the control of the hydraulic system 3 circulation pump were uplinked
to the Orbiter at 084:12:47 G.m.t. (02:04:34 MET). Circulation pump operations were
controlled by lower-than-normal temperatures to minimize the frequency and duration of
pump use.
A total of eight hydraulic system 3 circulation pump runs occurred during the mission.
Prior to these runs, the circulation pump inlet temperature was as low as 13 °F and the
rudder speedbrake (RSB) retum line was as low as -37 °F. The hydraulic system 3
reservoir quantity stabilized at approximately 41.6 percent during the third circulation
pump run and remained at approximately the same level for the remainder of the
mission.
In preparation for the planned EVA, depressurization of the ODS vestibule was
performed at 086:11:45 G.m.t. (04:03:32 MET). Depressurization of the cabin to
10.4 psia was subsequently completed at 086:12:40 G.m.t. (04:04:27 MET). The
airiock depressurization was initiated at 87:06:15 G.m.t. (04:22:02 MET). The EVA was
initiated at 087:06:34 G.m.t. (04:22:21 MET). The cabin was repressurized to 14.7 psia
at 87:07:10 G.m.t. (04:22:57 MET).
The first EVA during Orbiter/Mir docked operations was completed satisfactorily at
087:12:36 G.m.t. (05:04:23 MET) with a duration of six hours two minutes. The major
portion of the EVA was spent installing the Mir Environmental Effects Payload (MEEP)
clamps and equipment on the docking module. The crew also retrieved a video camera
that was mounted on the docking module for return on the Orbiter. Some minor
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problems were noted with an incomplete switch throw and loss of some biomedical
data, but these had no impact on the mission.
The crew reported that a camcorder in the Spacehab had experienced a cassette eject
failure. An in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure to clear the tape from the camcorder
was available, but this camcorder was not required. There were four additional
camcorders onboard, two of which were scheduled to remain on Mir.
The oxygen repressurization of the Orbiter/Mir stack by the Orbiter continued until hatch
closure. The Orbiter achieved the targeted cabin total pressure at hatch closure of 15.5
psia, with an oxygen concentration of 25 percent of the total module pressure.
Fifteen contingency water containers (CWCs) were filled with a total of approximately
1500 Ib of Orbiter supply water for transfer to the Mir during the flight.
A decision was made by the MMT to attempt to land one day early, on Saturday, March
30, 1996, at Kennedy Space Center, because of the forecasted unacceptable weather
conditions on Sunday, the planned landing day.
Difficulties were experienced communicating with Mir. Transmissions from Mir were
heard onboard the Orbiter, but Orbiter transmissions were not heard on Mir. The crew
performed troubleshooting procedures with the very high frequency (VHF) radio prior to
undocking. These procedures were unsuccessful in restoring the VHF link between the
Orbiter and Mir. Shortly after the crew terminated the troubleshooting procedures, the
Mir communications system was reconfigured, allowing successful two-way
communications between Moscow and Mir. The assessment is that the VHF problems
were due to the Mir communications configuration.
The ODS performance was nominal during the undocking phase of the mission. Final
hatch closure was completed as scheduled at 088:12:43 G.m.t. (06:04:30 MET).
Vestibule hatch closure was performed at 088:13:08 G.m.t. (06:04:55 MET), followed
by depressurization starting at 088:13:15 G.m.t. (06:05:02 MET), all in preparation for
undocking.
The ODS was powered up at 089:00:37 G.m.t. (06:16:24 MET). The structural hook
actuators were activated at 089:01:05:46.1 G.m.t. (06:16:52:42.1 MET) and both hook
gangs opened with dual-motor operation in approximately 2.5 minutes. The
undocking-complete signal was received at 089:01:08:03.4 G.m.t. (06:16:54:59.4 MET).
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) supported Mir undocking with a Iow-Z maneuver
at 089:01:08 G.m.t. (06:16:55 MET). The final separation maneuver utilizing two
thrusters was performed at 089:02:08 G.m.t. (06:17:55 MET) and lasted 12.5 seconds.
Thruster firings were nominal. The Orbiter digital autopilot (DAP) rates were very close
to the preflight predictions.
The two TCS units were activated at 089:00:15 G.m.t. (06:16:02 MET) to support Mir
undocking, and TCS 2 began tracking the target eight minutes later. TCS 1 did not
respond as expected, and a power cycle and re-execution of startup procedures were
performed. TCS 1 subsequently began tracking the target at 089:00:53 G.m.t.
(06:16:40 MET). Both sensors tracked until the reflectors went out of the field of view at
a range of approximately 500 feet. The sensors reacquired the reflector at least twice
during the fly-around and separation, and the last measured distance was 1232.1 feet.
As a result of the system 3 hydraulic leak during ascent, the decision was made not to
run an APU for flight control system (FCS) checkout. The checkout was instead
performed using the hydraulic system 1 circulation pump, and this verified essential
flight control capabilities for entry. The circulation pump was started at
089:04:53:29.3 G.m.t. (06:20:40:25.3 MET) and ran for 9 minutes 24 seconds.
Performance was nominal.
During the RCS hot-fire, primary thrusters L2U and R4R were deselected by RCS
redundancy management (RM) as failed-off because of low chamber pressure (Pc).
This was the first attempted firing of these thrusters this flight. The maximum Pc
reached was 13 psia and 10 psia, for L2U and R4R, respectively. Nominal Pc is
psia. The injector temperatures both dropped due to evaporative cooling, indicating
that partial pilot-valve flow was achieved on each valve. The injector temperature
recovery did not exceed the pre-firing temperatures, indicating there was none of the
heat soak-back that would be associated with normal combustion. The Pc traces did
not exhibit a slow pressure tail off; as a result, blocked Pc tubes were not suspected.
The L2U paper cover was noted to be wet prior to launch.
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Also during the RCS hot-fire, primary thruster L2L (S/N 234) was declared failed-leak at
089:06:11 G.m.t. (06:21:58 MET) by RCS RM, when the oxidizer injector temperature
dropped below the 30 °F leak detection limit. The leak began after the second nominal
hot-fire pulse. The crew visually observed oxidizer spraying from the area, and isolated
the left RCS manifold 2 at 089:06:16 G.m.t. (06:22:03 MET). The paper cover for L2L
was also noted to be wet prior to launch. The manifold isolation valve was reopened at
090:06:29 G.m.t. (07:22:16 MET) in an attempt to recover the remaining thruster on that
manifold. However, because primary thruster L2L continued to leak, the manifold was
again isolated at 090:07:33 G.m.t. (07:23:20 MET) when the fuel injector temperature
dropped below the flight rule limit of 40 °F. The manifold remained isolated for the
remainder of the mission.
All entry stowage and deorbit preparations were completed in preparation for entry on
the one-day-early landing day. The Ku-band antenna was stowed at 089:14:34 G.m.t.
(07:06:21 MET). The payload bay doors were successfully closed at
090:09:08:57 G.m.t. (08:00:55:53 MET). The two landing opportunities were waved-off
due to unacceptable weather conditions at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF). The
payload bay doors were subsequently reopened for on-orbit activities at 090:14:37:47
G.m.t. (08:06:24:43 MET) during the ensuing deorbit preparation backout.
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During payload bay door (PLB) re-opening after the wave off, both PLB centerline latch
9-12 release indications failed to indicate release after single-motor run time. The
release indication is normally obtained when the latch is in the full-open position. The
backup flight system (BFS) logic terminated the auto sequence when the release
indications were not obtained within the 40-second single-motor run time. The crew
reported that the 9-12 latch gang appeared to be fully open as viewed from the
Spacehab overhead view port. The crew manually commanded the latch to open and
saw no latch movement and still the release indication did not come on. Because the
latches appeared to be open, the crew completed door opening in manual mode. At
090:15:22 G.m.t. (008:07:09 MET), the centerline 9-12 release 2 indication recovered
with no crew action. The release 1 indication began toggling between on and off
beginning at 090:16:03 G.m.t. (008:07:50 MET), and at 090:16:14 G.m.t.
(008:08:01 MET) stabilized with the release indication on. The previous two flights of
OV-104 (STS-71 and -74) had nominal latch indications during door openings and
closures. The condition did not impact further door operations.
While reconfiguring from the payload bay door problem, the BFS went stand-alone
because the primary avionics software system (PASS) redundant set was reconfigured,
and remained stand-alone for approximately five minutes. After the crew entered an
input/output (1/O) reset to reinitiate PASS tracking by BFS, the BFS began to track the
PASS; however, the BFS unexpectedly remained on its intemal time rather than
synchronizing with the master timing unit (MTU). The phenomenon was explained as a
condition that occurs when the BFS is left stand-alone for extended periods of time.
This situation is recoverable with a BFS operational sequence (OPS)-0-to-OPS-3
transition.
Deorbit preparations were again performed prior to entry on the wave-off day, and the
payload bay doors were closed with nominal indications for this landing attempt at
091:08:09:31 G.m.t. (08:23:56:27 MET).
Prior to the deorbit maneuver on this first wave-off day, at 091:11:00 G.m.t.
(09:02:47 MET), while configured to the B controller, the WSB 3 vent temperature
decreased below the off-scale low value of 122 °F and remained there. After no cycling
was observed for several minutes, the WSB 3 controller was reconfigured from B to A
at 091:11:15 G.m.t. (09:03:02 MET). An increase in the vent temperature was
observed shortly after this reconfiguration, indicating nominal heater cycling had been
restored. At 091:11:43 Gom.t. (09:03:30 MET), the WSB 3B controller was reselected,
and the nominal cycling continued. Normal operation continued in this configuration for
the remainder of the mission.
The KSC landing opportunities on orbits 143 and 144 were waved off due to
unacceptable weather conditions at the SLF. The deorbit maneuver was performed at
091:12:23:08.1 G.m.t. (09:04:10:04.1 MET) on orbit 144 for a landing at Edwards Air
Force Base (EAFB) concrete runway 22, and the maneuver was 200.4 seconds in
duration with a _V of 356 ft/sec. Entry interface (400,000 ft) occurred at
091:12:57:33.3 G.m.t. (09:04:44:29.3 MET).
Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred on
EAFB concrete runway 22 at 091:13:28:56.8 G.m.t. (09:05:15:52.8 MET) on March 31,
1996. The Orbiter drag chute was deployed at 091:13:29:00.4 G.m.t., and the nose
gear touchdown occurred 7.4 seconds later. The drag chute was jettisoned at
091:13:29:31.4 G.m.t., with wheels-stop occurring at 091:13:29:52.0 G.m.t. The rollout
was normal in all respects. The flight duration was 9 days 5 hours 15 minutes and
53 seconds. APU 3 was shut down within 34 seconds following wheels-stop, and the
remaining two APUs were shut down approximately 15 minutes after landing.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPACE STATION
APPLICATION
The Spacehab soft stowage system provided versatility that proved to be invaluable for
transition of cargo between the Orbiter and Mir. Using the system enabled the crew to
complete all planned transfer activities and pack the Spacehab module at their
discretion with minimal direction from the ground controllers.
The lessons learned concerning the operation of the RCS are as follows:
1. Marginal heater power on the RCS vernier thrusters may result in injector
temperatures below the 130 °F operational limit during extended, non-active periods at
low Beta angles. Evaluation of the Mir cases resulted in a flight rule to allow restricted
vernier thruster operation at temperatures below 130 °F, based on extensive ground
data monitoring. A re-evaluation of this condition will be required for an Intemational
Space Station Alpha (ISSA) docked mission based on the predicted thermal
environment, ground monitoring capability, and flight crew workaround capabilities.
2. RCS vernier utilization (firing time) during STS-76 was higher than that
experienced on STS-74 and STS-71. The following table summarizes the data for the
six vemier thrusters.
COMPARISON OF VERNIER THRUSTER DATA
Thruster no. Firings Firing time, Thermal cycles Flight duration,
seconds hours
F5L 2920 5552.44 138
F5R 2906 7546.68 202
L5D 4027 7210.73 174
L5L 1794 3183.80 50
R5D 4131 8227.78 192
R5R 2459 3458.98 56 -
STS-76 Totals 18,237 35,180.44 812 216.75
STS-74 Totals 16,372 30,436 733 197
STS-71 Totals 19,907 32,327 840 223
The number of firings fell well within the 500,000 cycle certification life. The firing time
on the aft down-firing thrusters was very minimal when compared to the 125,000-
second certified limit (approximately 16.2-mission equivalent). Also, high duty-cycles
during the attitude-hold operations requires evaluation to determine if the 1000-
cycle/hour limit was exceeded. Evaluation of the STS-71, STS-74, and STS-76 data to
assess the long-term effects on the hardware is continuing.
Concerns from the certified life standpoint exist with the chamber/nozzle damage that
would require chamber replacement. Coating damage is primarily driven by thermal
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cycles. While all vemier thruster usage parameters vary depending on mission profile
and duration, average vemier thruster mission thermal cycles based on the evaluation
of 63 previous mission are:
Thruster F5L and F5R:
Thruster L5D and R5D:




With thermal cycles on the order of 1.3 to 3 times higher than the nominal mission
average, the chamber wear-out rate would be expected to increase if future Mir and
ISSA docked missions result in similar usage. This poses a significant spares risk to
the program and requires evaluation by engineering and logistics personnel. If vemier
usage can be optimized (minimized) by improved digital autopilot (DAP) models or
primary RCS thruster usage, the vernier usage may be significantly reduced from that
seen on the three Mir docking missions thus far, assuming future missions of similar
duration.
3. Thermal issues continue to be a concern for future ISSA missions, where cold
vernier thrusters and hot primary thrusters are expected. These thermal concerns are
under investigation by thermal personnel at Johnson Space Center (JSC).
Lessons learned and recommendations as a result of the first EVA while docked with
the Mir are as follows:
1. The universal foot restraint (UFR) should be further evaluated for use in
future EVA missions, including ISSA assembly and maintenance operations.
Consideration should be given to modifying the small United States (U. S) boot to the
same height at the toe bar interface as the large U. S. boot. This modification will allow
one toe-bar setting for all boots.
2. Either the multi-use tether (MUT) or the rigid tether (RT) should be declared
as the prime device for moving items in the size range of the MEEP during EVAs. Crew
comments should heavily influence which device is declared prime.
3. The crew comments from the STS-72 and STS-76 crewmembers should be
used in the selection of the most desirable hook designs.
4. An on-orbit test should be conducted of the UFR, MUT, and common tethers
with the Russian ORLAN suit to verify common hardware compatibility.
The flight control system implications to Space Station are as follows:
1. The capability of controlling and stabilizing Space Station payloads extended
over the Orbiter nose using the vernier RCS was successfully demonstrated.
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2. Improved control performance with the new minimum angle thruster selection
for Space Station-sized payloads was successfully demonstrated.
3. The capability to update the Mir inertial platform basis using Orbiter attitude
data was successfully demonstrated.
1]
PAYLOADS
The Spacehab module was a single-module configuration, similar to that flown on
previous Spacehab missions. STS-76 delivered a U. S. Astronaut to Mir, demonstrated
the feasibility of EVA for transferring and installing small items on the Mir, provided an
opportunity to evaluate rigid tether prototypes when transferring a large unit (MEEP) to
the Mir, demonstrated changeout of science hardware such as the Mir incubator
controller, retumed two key Mir components (KURS radars) for refurbishment, and
served as a pathfinder for the upcoming logistics/science resupply missions. All
Spacehab subsystems operated nominally throughout the mission.
Equipment and other items carried in the Spacehab module for STS-76 were
categorized into five types, of which a total of 4,787 Ib transferred to Mir. The types are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
a. Russian logistics - The Russian logistics were carried in a double rack that was
dedicated to the Russian equipment, which was made up of a gyrodyne to replace a
used gyrodyne, and an individual equipment and seat liner (IESL) kit for use by Mission
Specialist Shannon Lucid should return to Earth in the Soyuz capsule be required.
Approximately 1900 Ib of Russian items were stowed in the Spacehab soft stowage
system for transfer to the Mir. The logistics transfer to the Mir consisted of 2562 Ib of
Russian experiment equipment, 614.4 Ib of food, 42.2 Ib of nitrogen and 61.6 Ib of
oxygen, plus the gyrodyne, Russian storage batteries, film and IESL kit, as well as the
water that is discussed in a later paragraph. The total weight of all items transferred to
the Mir was 4,787 lb. Six items that were designated for transfer from Mir to Shuttle
were not found on Mir and not transferred to the Orbiter. One was for the Public Affairs
Office and five were science clean-up items that represent no loss of science.
b. EVA tools - The EVA tools and support equipment was carried in several soft
bags. Included in these bags were EVA tools, waist tethers, and a 35 mm camera and
accessories required to support the various Development Test Objectives (DTOs) and
Detailed Supplementary Objectives (DSOs).
c. RME - The RME hardware was carried in soft stowage bags and consisted of the
items discussed in the following two subparagraphs.
1. Mir Electric Field Characterization (MEFC) hardware - The MEFC experiment
collected data on the extemal and internal radio interference in the 400 Mhz to 18 Ghz
frequency band while being operated on the Orbiter flight deck. The experiment
hardware consisted of a radio frequency spectrum analyzer and power cable, an Orbiter
window antenna, and a payload general support computer (PGSC).
2. MEEP attachment brackets - The MEEP experiment was deployed during the
EVA with the attachment brackets clamped on Mir handrails. The MEEP will continue
12
to collect samples of orbital and micrometeoroid debris until the experiment is retrieved
on a later mission (STS-86).
d. American logistics - Fifteen full water bags, weighing 1506.6 Ib, were supplied
through the Shuttle's water system to the Mir station. In addition, new film was traded
for film already shot on the Mir. The docking module light and video camera that was
retrieved during the EVA was also returned.
e. Science and Technology experiments - The science and technology equipment
and supplies transferred the Mir Glovebox Stowage (MGBX), which was carried in soft
stowage bags to replenish hardware for the MGBX located in the Mir. The equipment
included a combustion experiments parts box, a passive accelerometer, a protein
crystal growth experiment, and the protein crystal growth thermal enclosure system
ancillary. Other science transferred to the Mir included the Queen's University
Experiment in Liquid Diffusion (QUELD), and the High Temperature Liquid Phase
Sintering (LPS) experiment.
The ESA's Biorack experiment was also carried for use in the Orbiter and was not to be
transferred to the Mir. The Biorack shared a double rack in the Spacehab with the Life
Sciences Laboratory Equipment (LSLE) Refrigerator/Freezer. The equipment included
in the Biorack consisted of incubator units, a glovebox, a power switching unit, an
extemal power data panel, and a soft stowage locker. The Biorack unit also made use
of three middeck lockers which contained a passive thermal control unit (PCTU).
A total of 11 experiments were flown of which three were from the U. S., three from
France, three from Germany, one from Switzerland and one from the Netherlands.
The LSLE refrigerator/freezer and the commercial refrigerator incubator module (CRIM)
performed nominally. The ESA Biorack experienced a data downlink problem during
activation, and the problem was traced to the software in a ground computer that
processed all the data. All data were collected onboard; consequently no data were
lost. Ten of the eleven preplanned Biorack investigations were completed successfully.
In preparation for landing one day early, Spacehab and Biorack personnel minimized
the loss of the science from the eleventh investigation to 10 percent.
KIDSAT PROJECT
The KIDSAT is a three-year pilot project that will fly once a year on the Shuttle.
STS-76 was the first flight of this Project. The middle school students, who participate
in this project, configure their own payload of digital video and a camera for flight on the
Shuttle, command the camera from their classrooms, and download their images of
Earth in near-real-time. Approximately 300 photographs were taken during the mission
using the onboard electronic still camera (ESC). These photographs were downlinked
via the Ku-Band Communication Adapter (KCA). Over 90 percent of the planned
photographs were taken. Some of the missed photographs were caused by the failure
of the onboard PGSC Thinkpad. The Thinkpad unexpectedly halted on orbit 22 and all
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orbit 23 photo opportunities were missed. After Atlantis undocked from the Mir,
atmospheric conditions adversely affected 60 percent of the photographs attempted
during the following orbit. Most of the remaining pictures were of good quality.
SHU'I'rLE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT
Five schools were chosen for contacts via the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment
(SAREX); however, no school contacts were made and only four personal contacts
were made. This condition resulted from the crew being unavailable because of the
shortened mission. Two of the personal contacts were successful and two were fair,
probably as a result of the inertial attitude and blockage from the combined Shuttle/Mir
vehicles. After the decision was made to retum a day early, the school contacts
scheduled for flight day 9 were delayed until a later mission. Two of the four remaining
contacts scheduled for flight day 8 were notified to prepare for the contacts; however,
the contacts subsequently had to be canceled because of crew workload.
RISK MITIGATION EXPERIMENTS
RME 1301 Mated Shuttle and Mir Structural Dynamics Test - This RME was scheduled
on an opportunity basis; however, since the Priroda module had not yet docked with the
Mir, this RME was performed.
RME 1302 Mir Electric Fields Characteristics - This spectral analyzer failed to initialize.
The crew was instructed to recycle through the activation steps of the analyzer, but this
was not successful. The experiment was stowed for entry with no data obtained. The
PGSC data cable was subsequently transferred to the Mir for use in developing a 25-
pin-to-9-pin converter cable to connect the radiogram system to the bubble jet ink
printer onboard Mir.
RME 1304 Mir Environmental Effects Payload - All four experiments were deployed in
the correct location and orientation on the Mir docking module during the EVA. The
MEEP hardware had no anomalous operations. The installation of the handrail clamps
and experiment containers was completed in a satisfactory manner.
RME 1306 Mir Wireless Network Experiment - The Mir Wireless Network was a
success and the data were collected in a timely manner. The Mir Wireless Network
was transported from the Mir stowage location to the Shuttle for the first operational
data collection. One full data set was collected at the initial middeck location and a
partial set at the flight-deck location. The Mir Wireless Network was then transported
back to the Mir where the initial full data set was collected as planned in the Spektr
module. A partial set was also collected at another location within the Spektr module.
RME 1310 Shuttle/Mir Aliqnment Stability - The Mir star tracker alignment was
performed at 084:10:23 G.m.t. (002:02:10 MET) and the onboard attitude was updated.
The attitude knowledge was based on the Mir precise star tracker measurements.
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NASA concurred that the star tracker correction corresponded to the errors indicated in
the Shuttle attitude error downlist of approximately 0.6 deg. No further maneuver of
star tracker align was required, and attitude data were collected during the five sleep
periods when the two vehicles were docked.
RME 1315 Trapped Ions in Space Environment - The Trapped Ions in Space
Environment (TRIS) was located in a Get Away Special (GAS) canister and was
activated on flight day 1 after the payload bay doors were open. The experiment
continued to operate and collect data through deactivated at 090:04:13 G.m.t.
(007:20:00 MET). The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the
results will be published in separate documentation.
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VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
The data review shows that all vehicle subsystems performed nominally and no
problems were noted that impacted the successful completion of the mission.
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
Analysis of the flight data and assessment of the postflight condition of the recovered
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) hardware indicates nominal performance of the SRB and
its subsystems. No SRB in-flight anomalies were identified. The SRB prelaunch
countdown was normal, and no SRB Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or Operations and
Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD) violations
occurred.
Both SRBs were successfully separated from the External Tank (E'r) at
3"+125.885 seconds, and visual reports from the recovery area indicated that all
deceleration subsystems performed as designed. Following day break, the SRBs were
recovered, towed to Cape Canaveral, and transferred to KSC for inspection,
disassembly and refurbishment.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
Analysis of the data indicates that the Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) flight
performance was well within the allowable performance envelopes, and was typical of
the performance observed on previous flights. The countdown was nominal, and no
LCC or OMRSD violations occurred. The maximum trace shape variation of pressure
versus time was calculated to be 0.63 percent at 62 seconds (left RSRM), and
0.47 percent at 72.5 seconds (right RSRM). Both values were well within the
3.2-percent allowable limit.
Power up and operation of all igniter and field joint heaters was satisfactory. All RSRM
temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits throughout the countdown. The
RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) was 61 °F at liftoff.
The aft skirt purge operated for a total of 22 hours 2 minutes. During the successful
countdown, the aft skirt purge was activated to maintain the nozzle/case temperatures
above the minimum LCC temperature. During the LCC time frame, the nozzle/case
joint temperatures ranged from 72 °F to 82 °F.
The postflight assessment showed that all J-joints (igniter and field) performed as
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(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Tailoff Imbalance Impulse Predicted Actual
differential, Klbf-sec N/A 247.1
Impulse Imbalance = Integral of the absolute value of the left motor thrust minus right
motor thrust from web time to action time. b
a All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a
b Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval).
EXTERNAL TANK
The ET subsystem performance was satisfactory, and all flight objectives were
satisfied. The ET propellant loading and flight operations met all objectives and
requirements. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated satisfactorily.
ET purge and heater operations were nominal. No LCC or OMRSD violations occurred.
No unexpected ice/frost formations were observed by the ice/frost team during the
countdown, nor was any frost observed in the acreage areas of the ET. Normal
amounts of ice/frost were present on the LH2 and LO2 feed-lines, the pressurization line
brackets and along the LH2 protuberance air load (PAL) ramps. All observations were
acceptable based on approved documentation (NSTS 08303). The ice/frost team also
reported that no anomalous thermal protection subsystem (TPS) conditions existed;
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however, two vertical strut TPS cracks were noted, and these were typical of conditions
observed on previous launches.
After SRB separation, the ET range safety system (RSS) signal strength frequently
dropped below the minimum requirement of -85 dBm when being tracked from the
Bermuda site. The lowest observed ET RSS signal strength after handover to the
Bermuda site was -100 dBm. The observed value did not exceed the command
sensitivity limit and would not have affected system operation. A post-ascent
investigation showed that the flight hardware was not at fault, but that the tracking site
had an antenna problem that resulted in low transmitted power.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and flight
operations. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the ullage pressure
slump was 13.4 psid.
ET separation was confirmed and ET entry and breakup occurred within the preflight
predicted impact area and was approximately 29 nautical miles uprange from the
preflight predicted impact point.
SPACE SHUI"FLE MAIN ENGINE
All Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) parameters were normal throughout the
prelaunch countdown and were typical of conditions observed on previous missions.
No OMRSD violations occurred. Engine ready was achieved at the proper time, all LCC
were met, and engine start and thrust buildup were nominal.
One in-flight anomaly was identified in that the fuel prebumer chamber channel A
igniter failed to indicate on at engine start on SSME 2 (Flight Problem STS-76-E-1).
This is the first occurrence of an igniter failing to indicate on at engine start. The lack of
a spark indication may be real or may be a failure in the monitoring circuit.
Troubleshooting is continuing in an effort to isolate the cause of the anomaly. Checkout
tests have not duplicated the anomaly on channel A; however, the fuel preburner
chamber channel B igniter has failed to spark during tests.
Flight data indicate that the SSME performance during mainstage, throttling, shutdown
and propellant dump operations was nominal with no in-flight anomalies or significant
SSME problems noted. The high pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high
pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures were well within the specification
throughout engine operation. Space Shuttle main engine cutoff (MECO) occurred at
512.56 seconds after liftoff.
At 120 seconds after MECO, the main oxidizer valve was unable to open for the normal
propellant dump sequence. The engine hydraulic system had been isolated from the
vehicle since approximately 50 seconds after engine shutdown to troubleshoot the APU
3 hydraulic leak discussed in the Orbiter subsystems portion of this report. The oxidizer
valve not opening was expected since no hydraulic pressure was present in the engine.
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As a result, a pneumatic shutdown was commanded by the engine controller to verify
that all valves were closed. The engine controller and software performed satisfactorily
in light of the anomalous Orbiter hydraulic leak condition.
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were
armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate (planned) times. All SRSS
measurements indicated that the system operated as designed throughout the
countdown and flight, with the exception of the ET range safety system (RSS) signal
strength, which fell below the 2.1 Vdc lower limit at approximately T + 7 minutes and
remained low until ET separation (approximately 2 minutes).
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power was tumed off




Ascent main propulsion subsystem (MPS) performance was completely nominal. Data
indicate that both (LO2 and LH2) pressurization systems performed nominally, and all
net positive suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight.
Throughout the countdown period, no significant hazardous gas concentrations were
detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the Orbiter aft compartment
(which occurred shortly after start of fast-fill) was approximately 175 ppm. This value
compares favorably with previous data from this vehicle. No LCC or OMRSD violations
occurred during the preflight period.
The LO2 and LH2 loading was performed as planned with no stop flows or reverts. A
comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus the
inventory (planned) loads shows a loading accuracy of 0.01 percent for LH2 and 0.08
percent for LO2.
STS-76 was the first flight of the GH2 pressurization systems modifications where all
prescribed modifications were completed. This modification involved rotating the flow
control valves (FCVs), rerouting the lines from the engine interface to the FCV manifold,
and incorporating filter housings and filters in all three engine legs plus the
prepressurization line for each engine. The performance of all four filter elements was
within the expected band determined from analysis. The GH2 system leaked at a rate
of 54.8 scim versus the allowable leakage of 15 scim. This leakage did not impact the
flight. Postflight tumaround activities will ensure that the leak is eliminated or that at
least the leak rate is reduced to an allowable level.
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All three FCVs performed nominally with the system 1 FCV experiencing no cycles,
system 2 experiencing nine cycles, and system 3 experiencing 36 cycles. All three
valves were replaced during STS-76 turnaround operations.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) performed satisfactorily during all firings and
major activities of the STS-76 mission. The RCS lessons learned from the STS-76
mission are discussed in the Lessons Leamed section of this report. The RCS
successfully supported all docking requirements as well as DTO performance
throughout the mission. Three in-flight anomalies were identified during the RCS hot-
fire test late in the mission. Three thrusters were deselected, one because of a leak
and the other two because of low chamber pressure (Pc), and all three thrusters
remained deselected for the remainder of the mission.
Propellant consumption by the RCS was 4,406.1 Ibm from the RCS tanks and an
additional 1896.0 Ibm from the OMS during interconnect operations.
The RCS supported Mir undocking with a Iow-Z maneuver at 089:01:08:03.4 G.m.t.
(06:16:54:59.0 MET). The final separation maneuver utilizing two RCS thrusters was
performed at 089:02:08 G.m.t. (06:17:55 MET) and lasted 12.5 seconds. Thruster
firings were nominal.
During the RCS hot-fire, primary thrusters L2U and R4R were deselected by RM as
failed-off because of low Pc (Flight Problems STS-76-V-03 and -04). This was the first
attempted firing of these thrusters this flight. The maximum Pc reached was 13 psia
and 10 psia, for L2U and R4R, respectively. Nominal Pc is 150 psia. The injector
temperatures both dropped due to evaporative cooling, indicating that partial pilot-valve
flow was achieved on each valve. The injector temperature recovery did not exceed the
pre-firing temperatures, indicating that the heat soak-back that would be associated
with normal combustion did not occur. The Pc traces did not exhibit a slow pressure tail
off; as a result, blocked Pc tubes are not suspected. The L2U paper cover was noted
to be wet prior to launch.
Also during the RCS hot-fire, primary thruster L2L (SIN 234) was declared failed-leak at
089:06:11 G.m.t. (06:21:58 MET) by RCS RM, when the oxidizer injector temperature
dropped below the 30 °F leak detection limit (Flight Problem STS-76-V-02). The leak
began after the second nominal hot-fire pulse. The crew visually observed oxidizer
spraying from the area, and isolated left RCS manifold 2 at 089:06:16 G.m.t.
(06:22:03 MET). The paper cover for L2L was also noted to be wet prior to launch.
The manifold isolation valve was reopened at 090:06:29 G.m.t. (07:22:16 MET).
However, primary thruster L2L continued to leak and the manifold isolation valve was
again closed at 090:07:33 G.m.t. (07:23:20 MET) when the fuel injector temperature
dropped below the flight rule limit of 40 °F. The manifold remained isolated for the
remainder of the mission.
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Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) performed satisfactorily throughout the
mission. The left-hand fuel gaging system failed to indicate the forward total quantity
level after the OMS 2 maneuver. However, during the OMS 5 maneuver, the gaging
system began indicating the correct level and did so for the remainder of the flight. This
gaging system has exhibited similar indications on two previous flights of this vehicle.
Propellant consumption during the seven OMS maneuvers plus the interconnect
operations was 18,923.1 Ibm of which 2069.9 Ibm (15.95 percent) were consumed by
the RCS during interconnect operations. The seven maneuvers performed are shown












































Deorbit Both 091:12:23:08.1 G.m.t. 200.4 356
09:04:10:04.1 MET
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performance was
nominal throughout the mission, and no in-flight anomalies were identified from the data
analysis. The PRSD supplied the fuel cells 2,438 Ibm of oxygen and 307 Ibm of
hydrogen. In addition, 167 Ibm of oxygen was supplied to the environmental control
and life support system (ECLSS), and 61 Ibm of that total was supplied to the Mir
Space Station. The Orbiter landed with 1,297 Ibm of oxygen and 143 Ibm of hydrogen
remaining, and this was sufficient for an 89-hour mission extension at average power
levels (125-hour extension at extension-day power levels of 11.1 kW).
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Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
Performance of the fuel cell powerplant (FCP) subsystem was nominal throughout the
mission with no in-flight anomalies identified. The fuel cell average electrical power
level and load were 15.9 kW and 523 amperes, respectively. The fuel cells produced
3,525 kWh of electrical energy and 2,745 Ibm of potable water while using 2,438 Ibm of
oxygen and 307 Ibm of hydrogen.
Four fuel cell purges were performed, and the fuel cell purge system operated
nominally in both the automatic and manual modes. The actual fuel cell voltages at the
end of the mission were 0.10 Volt above the predicted value for fuel cell 1, and
0.20 Volt above the predicted level for fuel cells 2 and 3.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The auxiliary power unit (APU) subsystem performance was nominal throughout the
STS-76 mission, and no in-flight anomalies were recorded. The APU run times and fuel
consumption for the mission are shown in the following table.

































59:26 128 86:03 140 07:40 12
85:17 191 112:03 234 37:48 70
a The FCS checkout was performed without operating the APUs.
b APUs I and 2 ran for approximately 15 minutes 20 seconds after landing. APU 3 ran
for I minute 30 seconds after landing.
c Totals include 08 minutes 02 seconds of high-speed run time for APU 1, and
08 minutes 01 second of high-speed run time for APU 2.
During the ascent phase, a hydraulic leak from system 3 was noted. Analysis of the
hydraulic system 3 leak data showed a significant decrease in the hydraulic system 3
reservoir quantity of approximately 1 percent]minute of run time. The quantity
decreased from 63 percent to 54 percent with a slight increase to 56 percent prior to
APU shutdown. As a result of the system 3 hydraulic leak during ascent, the decision
was made not to run an APU for FCS checkout. The checkout was instead performed
using the hydraulic system 1 circulation pump, and this verified essential flight control
capabilities for entry. Also, APU 3 was not started until terminal area energy
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management (TAEM), was operated in low-pressure mode, and the APU was shut
down shortly after wheels stop on the runway.
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem
The hydraulics/water spray boiler (WSB) subsystem met all requirements placed on it
during the mission. Four in-flight anomalies occurred and these are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
During the ascent phase, a hydraulic leak from system 3 was noted (Flight Problem
STS-76-V-01). The hydraulic system 3 leak data indicated a significant decrease in the
hydraulic system 3 reservoir quantity of approximately 1 percent/minute of run time.
The quantity decreased from 63 percent to 54 percent with a slight increase to 56
percent prior to APU shutdown. The thrust vector control (TVC) isolation valve for this
system was closed in an attempt to halt the leak; however, the reservoir quantity
continued to decrease. APU 3 was taken to the low-pressure mode shortly after valve
closure. APUs 1 and 2 were shut down while APU 3 was left running in the low-
pressure mode for an additional four minutes. No significant quantity decrease was
noted during low-pressure operation. The APU was shut down. Approximately
48 hours later, the hydraulic system 3 reservoir quantity showed a slight decrease to
44.0 percent. A comparison of plots of quantity versus temperature for each hydraulic
system showed a similar quantity decrease rate on each system, which indicated that
system 3 was not leaking while shut down.
The hydraulic system data were presented to the MMT for a final determination of the
manner in which the mission was to be completed. The decision was made to continue
the mission to the planned landing time on March 31, 1996, with some tightening of the
landing constraints concerning crosswinds, cloud coverage and landing-site selection.
The Russian Mission Control Center personnel requested that the aft compartment vent
doors be closed to preclude contamination by any free hydraulic fluid that may exist in
the aft compartment. Port vent doors 8 and 9 were closed at 084:00:25 G.m.t.
(01:16:12 MET), and starboard vent doors 8 and 9 were closed three minutes later.
Revised limits for the control of hydraulic system 3 circulation pump were uplinked to
the Orbiter at 084:12:47 G.m.t. (02:04:34 MET). These new limits controlled circulation
pump operations with lower-than-normal temperatures to minimize the frequency of
pump use.
Several circulation pump runs were performed either manually or automatically over the
course of the mission, and based on the data, none resulted in further hydraulic fluid
leakage.
As a result of the system 3 hydraulic leak during ascent, the decision was made not to
run an APU for FCS checkout. The checkout was instead performed using the
hydraulic system 1 circulation pump and this verified essential flight control capabilities
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for entry. The circulation pump was started at 089:04:53:29 G.m.t. (06:20:40:25 MET)
and ran for 9 minutes 24 seconds. Performance was as expected.
During FCS checkout, it was noted that hydraulic system 2 and 3 pressures (reservoir
and circulation pump) exhibited slight dips while exercising the flight control system.
This pressure response was most likely caused by minimal inter-system leakage due to
switching-valve action. Normal circulation-pump pressure (approximately 250 psia) was
attained on system. However, as expected, during the high-flow demand periods of the
checkout, the fixed-displacement pump could not maintain 250 psia. Drops in pressure
occurred to as low as 103 psia. This, in turn, caused switching valve movement.
Analysis of data revealed that a period of under-cooling occurred on WSB system 3
during the ascent APU run (Flight Problem STS-76-V-05). When the APU lubrication-
oil temperature reached 307 °F, controller B was selected, and 31 seconds later cooling
was observed. This condition did not impact APU or hydraulic system operations.
During ascent, hydraulic system 2 experienced two periods of over-cooling to 195 °F
and 202 °F (Flight Problem STS-76-V-06). Both over-cooling periods occurred while
operating on the A controller. APU 2 was shut down during the second over-cooling
period and the lubrication oil temperature had reached 193 °F. A similar problem
occurred on the last flight of this vehicle.
At 091:11:00 G.m.t. (09:02:47 MET), prior to the deorbit maneuver, the WSB 3 vent
temperature 2 went off-scale low (122 °F) (Flight Problem STS-76-V-07). Nominally,
the heater cycles at approximately 145 °F. The system was operating on the B
controller, and the signature indicates that the B heater failed off. The system was
switched to the WSB 3 A controller at 091:11:16 G.m.t. (09:03:03 MET), and a rise in
the vent temperature was observed a short time later. About 30 minutes later and after
a nominal heater cycle on the A controller, the system was switched back to the B
controller. Nominal cycling of the B vent heater was observed for the remainder of the
flight.
Hydraulic performance during entry was nominal for the modified entry flight plan
developed because of the system 3 leak during ascent. APU 2 was activated five
minutes prior to deorbit maneuver ignition, and APU 1 was started 13 minutes prior to
entry interface. APU 3 was started at TAEM and remained in low pressure until
shutdown (approximately 34 seconds after wheels stop). No unusual behavior or
unexpected operation was noted during descent and landing.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed satisfactorily
during all phases of the STS-76 mission. The data review and analysis did not show
any abnormal or anomalous behavior.
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Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
The environmental control and life support subsystem (ECLSS) performed nominally
throughout the mission.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system (ARPCS) performed normally.
The Orbiter and Mir docking system interface was checked by pressurizing the vestibule
and performing a subsequent leak check. After the mating interface was confirmed to
have no leaks, the Orbiter and Mir volume pressures were equalized to a pressure of
14.23 psia and the Mir/Shuttle transfer hatches were opened.
In preparation for the EVA, the vestibule was depressurized and the external
airlock/tunnel-adapter hatch was closed. The Orbiter cabin was depressurized to
10.2 psia and repressurized to 14.7 psia during the EVA. Following the EVA, the
Orbiter/Mir volume was pressurized to 14.23 psia. Using the Shuttle repressurization
configuration, the entire Orbiter/Mir pressure was increased to 14.62 psia and then to
15.54 psia using the oxygen transfer system. This was the first use of the oxygen
transfer system, which includes a 7.7 Ib/hr flow orifice connected to a launch/entry suit
(LES) hose that allowed a continuous flow of oxygen with minimal crew interaction.
Total consumables transferred to the Mir during the docked phase were 42.2 Ib of
nitrogen and 61.6 Ib of oxygen. The nitrogen was used for Mir pressurization, and the
oxygen was used for metabolic consumption during docked operation and for raising
the total pressure and partial oxygen pressure (PPO2) to 15.4 psia and 3.94 psia,
respectively. Vestibule repressurization and depressurization were nominal.
The supply water and waste management systems performed normally. Supply water
was managed through the use of the FES and water transfer to the Mir. The supply
water dump line temperature was maintained within satisfactory limits by using the line
heater.
The crew observed gas bubbles in the water after galley activation. After performing
the galley-purge procedure, the crew reported an acceptable level of bubbles in the hot
water and no bubbles in the cold water.
The hardware used for the STS-76 Mir water transfer performed nominally. Fifteen
contingency water containers (CWCs) were filled with a total of approximately 1506 Ib
of Orbiter supply water that was transferred to the Mir during the flight. The CWCs
were filled in an average of 46.5 minutes at a rate of 2.16 Ib/min. The iodine and iodide
was removed from the water as the CWCs were filled. All of the CWCs had silver
biocide added and eight of the CWCs had minerals added to allow the Mir crew to use
that water for drinking water. Samples were taken from each CWC during the flight and
from the iodine removal system after each CWC was filled. All of these samples were
retrieved posfflight, and an analysis has shown no iodine or iodide in the water.
Postflight, an additional CWC was filled using the same transfer hardware, and this
CWC will be used for a long-term stowage test. Samples taken from this CWC also
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indicate that all iodide and iodine in the Shuttle water was removed by the iodine
removal system, and no bacterial growth was present.
During the fill of the seventh water-transfer CWC, the crew experienced problems with
the operation of the syringe used for mineral injection (Flight Problem STS-76-F-02).
The minerals were successfully injected; however, during a second flush of the syringe,
the crewmember could not exert enough force to push the plunger down and re-inject
the water into the CWC. The mineral syringe was removed, and the silver biocide
syringe was used successfully. During a subsequent CWC fill, a spare mineral syringe
was used successfully. The inoperable syringe was labeled so that it could be
evaluated after landing.
The waste water was gathered at approximately the predicted rate. Three waste water
dumps were performed at an average dump rate of 2.03 percent/minute (3.35 Ib/min).
The waste water dump line, vacuum vent line, and vacuum vent nozzle temperatures
were maintained within acceptable limits.
The waste collection system performed normally throughout the mission.
Airlock Support System
The airlock depressurization valve was used to depressurize the cabin from 14.47 psia
to 10.43 psia, and the airlock from 10.2 psia to a vacuum for the EVA. All hardware
performed nominally during the EVA.
After docking with the Mir, the external airlock-to-vestibule hatch equalization valve was
used to equalize the Mir and Orbiter habitable volume pressures.
The active-system-monitor parameters indicated normal outputs throughout the flight.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystems
The smoke detection system (SDS) showed no indications of smoke during the entire
flight. Use of the fire suppression system was not required.
Avionics and Software Support Subsystem
The integrated guidance, navigation, and control system performed satisfactorily
throughout the mission.
The flight control system performance during docked operations was nominal, with no
dynamic interaction stability considerations observed. The Shuttle controlled the mated
stack with vemier RCS for the entire mated phase, except for a single 90-minute period
when the Mir was given control of the stack. The Mir assumed control to perform an
alignment of the inertial basis using the backup Mir star tracker. Shuttle control was
maintained with 5-degree and 1-degree vemier RCS deadbands. A review of the
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propellant consumption during the periods of inertial hold indicated that the preflight
estimates matched the flight consumption within approximately 5 percent.
No flight control anomalies were observed, but degraded FCS performance was noted
in the presence of the depressurization vent force during the depressurization of the
crew cabin for the EVA. Tighter-than-desired one-sided limit cycles were observed
during the initial period of the vent disturbance while the Shuttle estimate of the
disturbance acceleration converged on the actual value. However, degraded
performance in the presence of these types of disturbances can be expected with the
reduced filter gains and firing inhibit enabled.
Analysis of the Shuttle downlist during the Mir control period indicated that the Mir
attitude control system (ACS) performed nominally. Prior to the selection of Mir control,
the Shuttle attitude quaternion was transmitted to the Russians and uplinked to the Mir
to provide a coarse alignment. Following receipt of these data and near the end of the
Mir control period, a precise alignment was completed using the Mir star tracker.
Ideally, zero error should exist in the Shuttle attitude error as both inertial platforms had
been aligned and the Mir gyrodynes provide precise control; however, the error still read
approximately 0.4, 0.1, and 0.2 degree in Shuttle roll, pitch, and yaw, respectively.
This error would indicate a structural misalignment between the two vehicles of
approximately 0.5 degree.
As a result of the system 3 hydraulic leak during ascent, the decision was made not to
run an APU for FCS checkout. The checkout was instead performed using the
hydraulic system 1 circulation pump. The circulation pump was started at
089:04:53:29 G.m.t. (06:20:40:25 MET) and ran for 9 minutes 24 seconds. This was
the first time that this option had been exercised during the Shuttle Program because of
an anomaly, and performance was nominal.
During payload bay (PLB) door re-opening after the planned-landing-day wave off, both
PLB door centerline latch 9-12 release indications failed to indicate release after single-
motor run time. The release indication is normally obtained when the latch is in the full-
open position. The BFS logic terminated the auto sequence when the release
indications were not obtained within the 40-second single-motor run time. While
reconfiguring from the payload bay door problem, the backup flight system (BFS) went
stand-alone because the primary avionics software system (PASS) redundant set was
reconfigured, and remained stand-alone for approximately five minutes. After the crew
entered input/output (I/O) reset to reinitiate PASS tracking by BFS, the BFS began to
track the PASS; however, the BFS remained on its intemal time rather than
synchronizing with the master timing unit (MTU). The phenomenon was explained as
an expected condition that occurs when the BFS is left stand-alone for extended
periods of time. This situation was recoverable with a BFS operational sequence
(OPS)-0-to-OPS-3 transition.
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Entry was accomplished with hydraulic systems 1 and 2. System 3 was operated in low
pressure from TAEM through rollout and systems APU 1 and 2 were operated at high
speed during this period. Control during the period from TAEM to landing was nominal.
Displays and Controls Subsystem
The displays and controls subsystem performed nominally throughout the mission, and
no in-flight anomalies were identified.
Communications and Trackin.q Subsystems
The communications and tracking subsystems performed nominally, and no in-flight
anomalies were identified. Ku-band antenna deployment was satisfactory, and Ku-
band operation in the radar and communications modes was nominal.
The on-orbit S-band Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) operation was nominal
with some incidents of radio frequency interference (RFI). Data analysis showed no
hardware problems. The RFI did not operationally impact on-orbit operations.
Difficulties were experienced communicating with the Mir. Transmissions from Mir were
heard onboard the Orbiter, but Orbiter transmissions were not heard on Mir. The crew
performed troubleshooting procedures with the VHF radio prior to undocking. These
procedures were unsuccessful in restoring the VHF link between the Orbiter and Mir.
Shortly after the crew terminated the troubleshooting procedures, the Mir
communications system was reconfigured, allowing successful two-way
communications between Moscow and Mir. The assessment was that the VHF
problems were due to the Mir communications configuration as no hardware nor Orbiter
problems have been identified that would cause this problem.
The Ku-band radar acquired Mir at 083:23:09 G.m.t. (01:13:56 MET) at a range of
137,861 feet (approximately 23 nmi.). Mir was tracked to a range of 330 feet at
084:01:50 G.m.t. (01:17:37 MET), at which time the Ku-band was configured to the
communications mode for downlink of docking video. The trajectory control sensors
(TCSs) 1 and 2 were activated at 083:23:58 G.m.t. (01:15:45 MET) and
084:01:22 G.m.t. (01:17:09 MET), respectively and performed satisfactorily.
The two TCS units were activated at 089:00:15 G.m.t. (06:16:02 MET) to support Mir
undocking, and TCS 2 began tracking the target eight minutes later. TCS 1 did not
respond as expected, and a power cycle and re-execution of startup procedures were
performed. TCS 1 subsequently began tracking the target at 089:00:53 G.m.t.
(06:16:40 MET). Both sensors tracked until the reflectors went out of the field of view at
a range of approximately 500 feet. The sensors reacquired the reflector at least twice
during the fly-around and separation, and the last measured distance was 1232.1 feet.
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Operational Instrumentation/Modular Auxiliary Data System
The operational instrumentation (OI)/modular auxiliary data system (MADS) performed
satisfactorily throughout the mission. No in-flight anomalies were identified.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
The structures and mechanical subsystems performed nominally throughout the
mission. No in-flight anomalies were identified from the data; however, one problem did
occur after the first wave-off of landing. The drag chute performance was nominal. The
table on the following page presents the significant landing parameters.
All ET/Orbiter separation devices functioned properly. No debris was found on the
runway below the ET/Orbiter umbilical cavities, nor was any debris found on the runway
as a result of the landing.
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During PLB door re-opening after the wave off, both PLB centerline latch 9-12 release
indications failed to indicate release after single-motor run time. The release indication
is normally obtained when the latch is in the full-open position. The BFS logic
terminated the auto sequence when the release indications were not obtained within
the 40-second single-motor run time. The crew reported that the 9-12 latch gang
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appeared to be fully open as viewed from the Spacehab overhead view port. The crew
manually commanded the latch to open and saw no latch movement and still the
release indication did not come on. Because the latches appeared to be open, the
crew completed door opening in manual mode. At 090:15:22 G.m.t. (008:07:09 MET),
the centerline 9-12 release 2 indication recovered with no crew action. The release 1
indication began toggling between on and off beginning at 090:16:03 G.m.t. (008:07:50
MET), and at 090:16:14 G.m.t. (008:08:01 MET) stabilized with the release indication
on. The condition did not impact further door operations.
Following wheels stop, the tires were observed to be in good condition. Also, the drag
chute functioned nominally. All drag chute hardware except the mortar cover was
recovered and none showed any obvious signs of abnormal wear.
Orbiter Docking System
The Orbiter docking system (ODS) performance was nominal and no in-flight anomalies
were identified. During extension of the docking dng from the initial position to the final
position at 083:09:46:25 G.m.t. (01:01:33:21 MET), the display power on heater 2 did
not indicate on. This same problem had surfaced during ground turnaround activities at
KSC, and troubleshooting revealed that only the indication was faulty and power was
being applied to the heaters and display. The ODS was powered up for docking at
084:01:54:49 G.m.t. (01:16:41:45 MET), and 34 seconds later the heater 2 display
power-on indication came on and remained on for the remainder of the docking
sequence until power was removed from the ODS.
The ODS avionics hardware performed nominally throughout initial contact, capture,
damping, associated docking-ring drives, and structural-hooks closure with capture
latch release. Capture was nominal and occurred at 084:02:34:02 G.m.t.
(01:18:20:58 MET) and was followed by activation of the electromagnetic dampers
(brakes) for 30 seconds. Data showed that the dampers remained on for 60 seconds
even though the power was cut off by the automatic sequence at 30 seconds. This
condition was unexpected, but is explained by the design of the clutch that activates the
dampers. If any residual torque is acting on the dampers when damper power is
removed, the high energy dampers may remain engaged. This condition was present
during the docking with the Mir and was caused by high energy damper 3 remaining
engaged because of the relative motion present at that time. The crew interrupted the
automatic docking sequence by removing power 78 seconds after docking to allow
further damping, and this in tum caused the Orbiter to develop increased post-capture
rotation relative to the Mir (>7 deg). The ring-aligned signal came on even though a
considerable angular misalignment still existed. Damping was completed after about 9
minutes and 19 seconds at which time the crew reinitiated the automatic docking
sequence to drive the docking ring to the final position. The structural hooks were
activated and were closed within 2.5 minutes. Docking was completed at
084:02:50:09.9 G.m.t. (01:18:37:05.9 MET). The ODS was powered down at
084:02:52:42 G.m.t. (01:18:39:38 MET).
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The ODS performed satisfactorily during the undocking operations. The ODS was
powered up for undocking with the Mir at 089:00:37:38 G.m.t. (06:16:24:34 MET), and
the heater 2 power on indication remained on for the 39 minutes the ODS was powered
for undocking. Undocking was completed at 089:01:08:03.4 G.m.t.
(06:16:54:59.4 MET).
Integrated Aerodynamics, Heating and Thermal Interfaces
The prelaunch thermal interface purges were nominal.
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal. There were no programmed test
inputs for this flight.
The ascent aerodynamic and plume heating was nominal. Likewise, the entry
aerodynamic heating to the SSME nozzles was nominal.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The thermal performance of the OV-104 vehicle thermal control subsystem (TCS) on
this mission was nominal during all phases. All subsystem temperatures were
maintained within acceptable limits. No heater failures or instrumentation anomalies
were noted. The beta angle ranged from approximately -12.9 degrees at orbital
insertion to +31.9 degrees at entry interface (El). The orbital inclination was
51.6 degrees, and the orbital altitude ranged from 172 to 216 nautical miles during the
mission.
During the on-orbit phase of the mission, thermal analyses were performed to evaluate
changes to the planned attitude timeline (ATL). ATL changes resulted from, among
other things, a one-day launch delay due to weather. Ten revisions to the planned
ATL, including an early-retum mission ATL, were assessed. Also considered were a
275-second duration vemier thruster firing during the docked phase and minimizing the
operation of hydraulic circulation pump 3.
In the ATL versions, the OMS oxidizer high-point bleed line (HPBL) quick disconnect
temperature was predicted to approach the +20 °F minimum limit during the nose-sun
type attitudes as well as during the port-side sun attitudes. Also, during the first docked
day attitude, a bending effect "anytime return" temperature limit was predicted to
approach the upper (violation) limit. However, both concems were affected by the Mir
presence (shading and insulating effects). The OMS HPBL quick disconnect
temperature remained well above the predicted level because of the one-day launch
delay change to the Sun clock and the cone angles for the nose-sun type attitudes.
The new Sun angle warmed the starboard sidewall structural temperature above the
preflight prediction. The warm sidewall, coupled with the better-than-expected heater
duty cycle resulted in HPBL quick disconnect temperatures well above the predicted
level. Also, the Mir presence influenced the best estimate trajectory (BET) predicted
temperatures by insulating the sill Iongerons from their view of space.
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Aerothermodynamics
The Orbiter entry aerothermodynamics were as expected for the STS-76 mission. The
acreage heating and local heating were nominal. The boundary layer transition was
also nominal.
Thermal Protection Subsystem and Windows
The TPS performed satisfactorily. Based on structural temperature response data
(temperature rise), the entry heating was above average for this vehicle. Structural
temperature rises on the lower surface exceeded previous maximums for this vehicle in
most cases. The largest exceedance was 5 degrees; however, all of the temperatures
were well within the flight experience of the Orbiter fleet.
Boundary layer transition from laminar flow to turbulent flow was symmetric and
occurred at 1170 seconds after entry interface at the aft centerline of the vehicle and
within 10 seconds on the aft right-hand and left-hand sides of the vehicle.
The postflight inspection of the TPS identified 69 damage sites (hits) of which 15 had a
major dimension of 1 inch or greater. This total does not reflect the numerous hits on
the base heat shield attributed to the flame arrestment sparkler system. A comparison
of these numbers to statistics from 57 previous missions of similar configuration
indicates that overall debris damage was below average, which is 90. Also the number
of hits on the lower surface with a major dimension of one inch or greater was 5, which












Right Side 2 8
Left Side 0 1
Right OMS Pod 1 3
Left OMS Pod 2 6
Total 15 69
The X-33 advanced TPS demonstrations flown on the upper body flap (FRCI-12/TUFI)
tiles, base heat shield (AETB-8TUFI/RCG) tiles, and aft fuselage sidewall (TABI)
blankets showed no signs of damage or degradation as a result of the flight.
Tile damage sites on the lower surface were generally located aft of the midpoint of the
vehicle and approximately equally distributed about the vehicle centerline. A cluster of
seven hits was noted forward of the main landing gear wells and slightly right of the
vehicle centerline. The nose landing gear door (NLGD) thermal barriers were in good
condition. A right-hand NLGD aft edge tile had a large damaged area on the lip
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(2.5 inches by 0.5 inch), which will probably require replacement. The typical debris
impact damage in the areas aft of the umbilical doors was not present after this flight.
Damage in this area is generally attributed to impact by the umbilical purge barrier
flapping against the tiles or impact by ET separation ice debris. Analysis of the STS-76
liftoff films showed that the purge barrier was tom away and released much earlier than
usual, and this condition probably accounted for the lesser amount of damage
observed. No lower surface damage was attributed to the wheels or tires.
The main landing gear door (MLGD) thermal barriers were in good condition. Two
thermal-barrier outer-cover ends were protruding on the left-hand MLGD. The right-
hand MLGD had two breached thermal barriers and four protruding outer cover ends. A
tile on the right-hand elevon-elevon gap had minor edge slumping.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was normal. The engine dome-mounted heat
shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were in good condition with the exception of torn and
missing blanket material at the 6 to 8 o'clock position of SSME 1.
Three tile damage sites were found on the vertical tail stinger lower surface as well as a
chipped tile edge immediately below the drag chute opening. Damage to these areas
most likely occurred as a result of the drag chute deployment.
Light hazing was observed on windows 3 and 4 with streaks on windows 2, 3, and 4.
Surface wipes were taken of all windows for laboratory analysis. Typical damage
resulting from impacts by RCS paper cover/room temperature vulcanizing (RTV)
material was observed on the perimeter tiles of windows 2, 3, 4, and 5.
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MIR RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS
The performance of the on-orbit rendezvous navigation and guidance for the fly-around
and for the rendezvous was nominal, and there are no concerns under investigation.
MIR RENDEZVOUS
The Mir rendezvous operations were initiated at 082:11:55:29.8 G.m.t.
(00:03:42:25.8 MET) when the OMS was used to perform the NC1 (OMS-3) Mir-
rendezvous maneuver. This was a 42.8-seconddual-engine, straight-feed firing. The
AV was 69 ft/sec, and this placed the vehicle in a 159 by 123 nmi. orbit. The NC2
(OMS-4) Mir-rendezvous maneuver occurred at 082:23:49:04.2 G.m.t.
(00:15:36:00.2 MET) using the right OMS engine configured for straight feed. The
maneuver was 9.8 seconds in duration with a resulting AV of approximately 8 ft/sec,
raising the orbit to 158.8 by 126.4 nmi. A 57.2-second dual-engine straight-feed NC3
(OMS-5) Mir-rendezvous maneuver occurred at 083:09:24:26.8 G.m.t.
(01:01:11:22.8 MET) with a AV of 93 ft/sec and a resulting orbit of 210 by 127 nmi.
OMS performance was nominal during all three of these maneuvers.
The NC4 (OMS-6) maneuver was performed in support of the Mir rendezvous. The
dual-engine NC4 firing was executed at 083:22:16:37.6 G.m.t. (01:14:03:33.6 MET) and
was 85.4 seconds in duration with a resultant AV of 141 ft/sec. The posffiring residuals
were below the 0.20 ft/sec trim limit. The apogee and perigee were raised to 214 nmi
and 203 nmi, respectively, and the closing rate with the Mir was decreased. Following
the OMS-6 maneuver, a successful gimbal check was performed on both gimbal drives.
The left orbital maneuvering engine (OME) was used for the terminal phase initiation
(TI) maneuver (OMS-7) at 083:23:51:38.2 G.m.t. (01:15:38:34.2 MET)that was
executed using the onboard solution. The firing duration was 11 seconds and the
resulting AV was 9.0 ft/sec.
The first rendezvous sensor pass used the star tracker for state vector updates. The
pass lasted approximately 22 minutes, and 175 marks were incorporated with no marks
rejected. The navigation-computed angular residuals (errors) never exceeded 0.3 deg
and the ratios (error/maximum allowable error) also never exceeded 0.3. The Orbiter
filter state vector was updated 875 ft and 1.1 ft/sec root sum square (RSS) by the end
of the pass.
During the star tracker pass, the first onboard rendezvous guidance maneuver solution
for the corrective combination (NCC) maneuver was computed. The final NCC
maneuver solution was very close to the ground-computed maneuver solution. The
onboard maneuver solution was performed with the RCS at the computed time of
083:22:53:56 G.m.t. (01:14:40:52 MET).
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Following the NCC maneuver, the rendezvous navigation was configured for a
rendezous radar (RR) pass. The Ku-band was configured for general purpose
computer (GPC)-commanded, passive target-track of the Mir. Initial RR lock-on
occurred at a range of approximately 140,000 ft and a closing range-rate of 83 ft/sec.
After the RR was selected as the source for Orbiter state vector updates, the residuals
and ratios were acceptable (both less than 0.1). During the RR pass, approximately
150 marks were accepted with none rejected. At the end of the pass, all of the ratios
were less than 0.01 and the relative state vector was updated by approximately 1350 ft
and 1.5 ft/sec.
After the transition back to major mode (MM) 201, the RR pass was reinitiated. The
error in the relative state vector induced by the TI maneuver (RR more sensitive than
IMUs) was removed after only a few marks. Shortly thereafter, a filter-to-propagated
state vector transfer was performed to ensure that the back-up state vector was also
updated.
Between the TI maneuver and Mir-intercept, the midcourse correction (MCC)
maneuvers (one through four) were executed to correct dispersions in the relative
trajectory and to ensure that the target was intercepted in daylight. All the MCC
maneuvers are nominally zero and are usually less than 2.0 ft/sec. The onboard
MCC 1 maneuver solution (< 1.0 ft/sec) was used as the basis to perform the RCS
maneuver at 084:00:13:50 G.m.t. (01:16:00:46 MET).
The time of ignition (TIG) for the second MCC maneuver varies as a function of the
elevation angle between the local horizontal of the Orbiter and the line-of-sight to the
target at the TIG. The desired elevation angle of 28.09 degrees is used to ensure that
the target is illuminated during proximity operations. The nominal variation between the
planned and actual TIG is +7 to -3 minutes, and for this rendezvous the MCC 2 TIG slip
was +4 minutes 35 seconds. The final onboard solution was used for the RCS
maneuver at 084:00:45:49 G.m.t. (01:16:32:45 MET).
The last two MCC maneuver solutions (3 and 4) were nominal with differential velocities
(AVs) of less than 0.5 ft/sec, and the maneuvers were performed 10 and 20 minutes
after the TIG of the MCC 2 maneuver, respectively.
During the time period between the TI maneuver and reaching a range to the Mir of less
than 100 ft, all RR range and range-rate navigation marks were accepted up to a
separation distance of approximately 600 ft. As the range to the Mir decreased, the RR
residuals and ratios became noisier, especially the angular residuals, and this lead to
the RR angle marks being inhibited at 470 marks. The RCS thruster firings during
proximity operations to establish braking gates, as well as the increasing angular size of
the Mir (beam wander), contributed to the noisy RR data.
The final rendezvous was completed nominally with radius vector axis (R-bar) crossing
occurring at approximately 084:01:10 G.m.t. (01:17:35 MET) with docking occurring
approximately 50 minutes later.
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MIR FLY-AROUND ACTIVITIES
Following the successful undocking and at a range of approximately two feet, a small
+Z separation firing was performed to initiate the separation. After the range became
greater than 100 ft, rendezvous navigation and system management (SM) antenna
software were configured for RR target track. Automatic navigation mark incorporation
was enabled after the RR acquired the Mir with the first mark being incorporated at a
range of 190 ft. The initial sensor residuals were small, and this indicated a solid RR
lock-on to the Mir.
After the range to the Mir reached 475 ft, a tail-forward attitude for the fly-around, which
would be conducted at twice the orbital rate, was established.
Prior to the minus velocity vector axis (-Vbar) crossing and after 91 RR navigation
marks had been incorporated, 11 angular (azimuth) marks were rejected in succession.
The azimuth error showed a dramatic increase from approximately 1.0 degree to
7.0 degrees. The range and range rate data were good, but the angular data error had
increased at a time when the covadance matrix was converged. It is currently theorized
that the size of the Mir and the changing aspect angle to the Mir caused the rejected
marks. Once the covariance matrix was reinitialized by the crew, the azimuth angle
mark incorporation began again automatically. Reinitializing the covariance matrix
loosened the edit criterion and allowed uninterrupted navigation mark incorporation for
the next 10 minutes (75 more marks) with no further rejects.
The fly-around was discontinued by performing the final separation maneuver at the
R-bar crossing. The separation maneuver was a 3.0 ft/sec retrograde firing, performed




The first EVA while docked with the Mir Space Station was satisfactorily performed
during the STS-76 mission and had a duration of 6 hours and 2 minutes. All objectives
of the EVA were accomplished and the EVA required only 30 minutes longer than
planned. The average metabolic rates for this EVA were calculated from primary
oxygen usage and were 705 Btu/hr for the EV 1 crewmember (Godwin) and 755 Btu/hr
for the EV2 crewmember (Clifford). The EMUs performed well during the EVA with only
one in-flight anomaly.
Extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) checkout began at approximately 083:05:13 G.m.t.
(00:21:00 MET). Both EMUs performed nominally during the checkout and were ready
to support the EVA on flight day six. The EMUs had several thermal conditioning
improvements to ensure crew comfort in the unique Shuttle/Mir environment. The
improvements included the capability to shut off the cooling water in case the EV
crewmember became too cool, battery-powered electric heaters for the finger-tips, and
other thermal clothing.
During EMU donning, no biomedical data were received from the EV2 crewmember
(Flight Problem STS-76-F-03). The problem was suspected to be in the biomedical
signal conditioner. The conditioner was replaced with the biomedical signal conditioner
from the medical kit. Since the medical kit unit was not calibrated for the EV2
crewmember, the signal amplitude was off-scale resulting in an inability to compile and
analyze trends in the data. At 087:10:21 G.m.t. (05:02:08 MET), during the EVA, EV2
experienced a loss of the electrocardiogram (ECG) signal; however, the signal was
regained 12 minutes later. The signal was lost again at 087:12:19 G.m.t.
(05:04:06 MET), just prior to airlock ingress, and the signal was intermittent for the
remainder of the EVA.
In preparation for the planned EVA, depressurization of the Orbiter docking system
(ODS) vestibule was performed at 086:11:45 G.m.t. (04:03:32 MET). Depressurization
of the cabin to 10.4 psia was subsequently completed at 086:12:40 G.m.t.
(04:04:27 MET). The airlock depressurization was initiated at 87:06:15 G.m.t.
(04:22:02 MET). The EVA was initiated at 087:06:36 G.m.t. (04:22:23 MET). The
cabin was repressurized to 14.7 psia at 87:07:10 G.m.t. (04:22:57 MET).
The EVA tasks consisted of installing four Mir Environmental Effects Payload (MEEP)
clamps on the Mir docking module, removal and return of a docking camera, and
transfer of four MEEP experiments from their stowage location in the payload bay to
mounting points on the Mir docking module. Additional objectives included performing
an evaluation of the universal foot restraint, a multi-use tether, a rigid tether, common
waist tethers, and 55-foot tethers. All of these items were designed to interface with the
Russian ORLAN space suit as well as the U. S. EMU.
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The crew noted a white paint residue on the EMU gloves after translating on the Mir
docking module handrails. The crew also reported that the bayonet fitting was not
properly oriented, preventing stowage of the large cable cutter on the modified mini-
workstation along with the MEEP clamps.
The universal foot restraint (UFR) performed satisfactorily, although some minor
problems with the toe bar were reported. One crewmember experienced unintentional
egress from the UFR on two occasions. The toe bar setting was a compromise to
accommodate both shoe types for this flight, so the unintentional egress was not
unexpected.
The common safety tethers performed nominally. Likewise, the common waist tethers
with improved hooks also performed satisfactorily. The common waist tethers were
used in a simulated Mir translation activity using the Russian hand-over-hand method,
which was described as a slow method of translation because of the high number of
hook install/remove cycles.
Both crewmembers used the multi-use tether (MUT) and the rigid tether (RT), and good
stability was provided while using these tethers.
Following the flight, an inspection of the EMU revealed cuts in the EMU gloves that
were to the depth of the pressure layer. An investigation board was organized to
determine the cause of these cuts and to prescribe the corrective action to prevent the
cuts in the future.
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FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
The Government furnished equipment/flight crew equipment (GFE/FCE) performed
nominally.
The crew reported that a camcorder in the Spacehab had experienced a cassette eject
failure. An in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure to clear the tape from the camcorder
was available, but this camcorder was not required. There were four additional
camcorders onboard available for use, two of which were scheduled to remain on Mir.
The crew was unable to locate a camera bayonet bracket that was to be used during
EVA. It was determined that this hardware had been inadvertently omitted from the
hardware shipment to KSC for stowage in the Spacehab module. A workaround was
developed that enabled the camera to be used for the EVA operations.
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CARGO INTEGRATION
The cargo integration hardware performance was nominal throughout the mission. No
in-flight anomalies were identified.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
DTO 310D -Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - This DTO is data-only, with the
data being recorded on the modular auxiliary data system (MADS) recorder. The data
were dumped from the MADS recorder postflight and were given to the sponsor for
evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - The DTO is data-only, with the data being
recorded on the MADS recorder, which is not dumped during the flight. The data were
dumped postflight and were given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the
evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance (Methods 1 and 3) (No maneuvers) - No hand-held
photography of the ET was obtained because of equipment difficulty. No +X translation
maneuver was performed.
Two rolls of umbilical well camera 16 mm film (5 mm and 10 mm lens) were obtained
from the LH2 umbilical. Good coverage of the left-hand SRB separation was acquired.
The views of the ET separation were unusable because of the night-time conditions.
Numerous light colored pieces of debris (probably insulation) and dark debris (probably
charred insulation) were seen throughout the SRB film sequence. Typical ablation and
charring of the LH2 umbilical electrical cable tray and the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut was
also seen. These events are typical of those seen on previous mission umbilical well
film and are not considered anomalous.
The 16 mm film has good to dark exposure and good focus. Timing data were not
present on the 16 mm films.
DTO 648 - Electronic Still Camera Test, (Configuration 2), Color ESC-II With
Downlink - Photographs were made of the joint docked operations and downlinked in
real time. The quality of the downlinked images was excellent.
DTO 671 - EVA Hardware for Future Scheduled EVA Missions (Test 12) - The common
foot restraint, common safety tethers, body/equipment tethers and thermal comfort in
the docked Mir environment were evaluated during the flight day 6 EVA, which
deployed the MEEPs and recovered the Docking Module (DM) camera and light as well
as evaluating the various pieces of EVA hardware. The crew comments on the EVA
hardware are found in the Extravehicular Activity Section of this report.
DTO 700-5 - Trajectory Control Sensors (Sensors Mounted on ODS, Pulse Mode Test
only) - The trajectory control sensors (TCSs) were used extensively during the
rendezvous and were a valuable source of data for the rendezvous operations. The
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evaluation of the TCS operations was completed and the publication of the results will
be in separate documentation.
DTO 700-10 - Orbiter Space Vision System Video Taping - The docking module target
and Mir configuration data were recorded for posfflight model development in support of
future Orbiter Space Vision System flight software.
DTO 700-13 - Signal Attenuation Effects of ET During Ascent - Data were collected for
this DTO during ascent. These data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation.
The results of the evaluation will be published in separate documentation.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - Weather conditions on landing day were
not conducive to performing this DTO.
DTO 1118 - Photographic and Video Survey of Mir Space Station - All photographic
surveys of the Mir during rendezvous and separation were completed. Other
photographic surveys were also accomplished during docking from both the Shuttle
middeck and the Spacehab. Additional photographs of the Kvant Russian EVA location
were requested by the Russians and were accomplished.
DTO 1210 - EVA Operations Procedures/Training - This DTO was completed in its
entirety with the completion of the postflight weightless Environment Training Facility
(WETF) session that corresponded to the length of the EVA. The evaluation of this
EVA will be published in a separate report.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 331 - LES and Sustained Weightlessness on Egress Locomotion - Data were
recorded during entry and continued to be taken postflight with a treadmill session. The
data were given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be
reported in separate documentation.
DSO 483 - Back Pain Pattem in Microgravity - Data were recorded in-flight and were
also recorded from a postflight back exam and debriefing. These data were given to
the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate
documentation.
DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crewmembers - Data were collected for this
DSO during the preflight and postflight assessments of the crewmembers. These data
were given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be
reported in separate documentation.
DSO 489 - EVA Dosimetry Evaluation - Data for this DSO were recorded during the
EVA, and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the
evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
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DSO 901 - Documentary Television - Video data were recorded of significant events
throughout the flight.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Motion pictures were taken of
the significant events that occurred during the flight.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - Still photographs were taken of the
significant events that occurred during the flight.
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSES
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSES
Twenty four videos of the launch were screened and no anomalies or significant items
were noted. In addition, eighteen 35 mm films and twenty-four 16 mm films were
screened. The only significant item noted was a bolt hang-up on left-hand SRB
hold-down post M-5 at liftoff. Slight holddown post shoe movement was also visible
prior to bolt release.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSES
No requests for screening of onboard photography or video were made of the JSC
team.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSES
Six videos of the landing were screened. The only significant item was that the main
landing gear door opening and gear deployment did not occur synchronously. The
starboard main gear door opened 0.333 second after the port side main gear door. No
other significant conditions were noted.
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Throttle up to 104 Percent
Thrusta
Throttle down to
67 Percent Thrust =
Maximum Dynamic Pressure
(q)
Throttle up to 104 Percenta
Both SRM's Chamber














APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
LH HPU System A start command
LH HPU System B start command
RH HPU System A start command
RH HPU System B start command
ME-3 Start command accepted
ME-2 Start command accepted
ME-1 Start command accepted











RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
RH rate APU turbine speed - LOS


























































TABLE I.- STS-76 MISSION EVENTS
(Continued)

































Payload Bay Doors Close 1
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU 2 GG chamber pressure
APU 3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open I
Port radiator deployment 1
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Port radiator latch no.7-12 latch 2
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve Position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve Position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve Position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Docking ring final position
EMU battery power on
Initiation of airlock repressurization
Actuation of hooks no. 1 drive
Undock complete
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
Hyd. Sys. 1 Circ. Pump Pressure
Hyd. Sys. 1 Circ. Pump Pressure
PLBD left close 1















































TABLE I.- STS-75 MISSION EVENTS
(Concluded)
Event
Payload Bay Doors Reopen
Payload Bay Doors Close 2
/kPU Activation for Entry
Deorbit Burn Ignition
Deorbit Bum Cutoff
Entry Interface (400K feet)
Blackout end














PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
PLBD left close 1
PLBD dght close 1
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Current orbital altitude above
Data locked (high sample rate)
Major mode change (305)
LH main landing gear tire pressure 1
RH main landing gear tire pressure 2
RH main landing gear weight on
wheels
LH main landing gear weight on
wheels
Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts
NLG no weight on wheels
NLG 1 RH tire pressure 1
Drag chute jettison 1 CP Volts
Velocity with respect to runway
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure









































































































































































































































In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data for
this mission report, the following list is provided.
1. Flight Requirements Document
2. Public Affairs Press Kit
3. Customer Support Room Daily Science Reports
4. MER Daily Reports
5. MER Mission Summary Report
6. MER Quick Look Report
7. MER Problem Tracking List
8. MER EventTimes
9. Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs
10. MOD Systems Anomaly List
11. MSFC Flash Report
12. MSFC EventTimes
13. MSFC Interim Report
14. Crew Debriefing comments




The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions as these items












































attitude control system (Mir)
auxiliary power unit




British thermal unit per hour









Edwards Air Force Base
electrocardiogram
Environmental Control and Life Support System
entry interface
extravehicular mobility unit


















high pressure fuel turbopump
high pressure oxidizer turbopump























































International Space Station Alpha
Johnson Space Center
Ku-band communication adapter








Lockheed Martin Engineering and Science
liquid oxygen
Liquid Phase Sintering
Life Science Laboratory Equipment Refrigerator/Freezer
modular auxiliary data system
midcourse correction maneuvers
main engine cutoff
Mir Environmental Effects Payload













net positive suction pressure










primary avionics software system
chamber pressure
passive thermal control unit














































propellant mean bulk temperature
parts per million
partial pressure oxygen
power reactant storage and distribution
pound per square inch absolute
pound per square inch differential








Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
Range Safety System/room sum square
rigid tether
room temperature vulcanizing (material)
safe and arm






Shuttle range safety system
Space Shuttle main engine
Space Transportation System
terminal area energy management
thermal control subsystem/trajectory control sensors








minus velocity vector axis
very high frequency
Weightless Environment Training Facility
water spray boiler
B-3

